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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
One of the radical changes made by the Sales Act in the law of Pennsylvania
is in the words required to constitute an express warranty, though our Supreme
Court has been slow to recognize this fact.
14
The present law of England was settled by the House of Lords' decision in
Heilbut i. Buckleton.16 As Professor Williston has said, "That good old doctrine
for the encouragement of trade, known as caveat emptor, has received no such sup-
port for many years."' 16 The stock was misrepresented to be that of a "rubber com-
pany." This was false but it was held that the representation did not constitute
a warranty.
The Sales Act deals with many problems upon which the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act is silent. The Sales Act made many changes in the common law rules
as found in the Pennsylvania cases. The legislature should decide as to whether
the common law rules or those of the Sales Act should be applied to sales of stock
when the Uniform Stock Transfer Act is silent on the subject. Such decisions as
that in the principal case are an evasion of the issue by a mere judicial declaration
of what every student of the law knows to be incorrect.
It might be added that since the relationship of the parties in the principal
case was that of broker and customer and the broker appears to have bought the
stock from a third party for the plaintiff, the provisions of the Sales Act could not
possibly be applied, for the act relates to the buyer-seller relationship and not the
principal-agent relationship. Liability arose from disobedience, failure to buy what
was ordered- not warranty. Even the one section of the act that includes stocks
can not be invoked in controversies between a stock broker and his customer.
17
Joseph P. McKeehan
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
This note is limited to a discussion of residence requirements for divorce and
does not discuss the annulment of marriage.
There is no requirement that the parties to a divorce action must have been
married within the Commonwealth; that the cause of action must have accrued
in Pennsylvania; or that the parties must have been domiciled here when the cause
of action accrued. The Pennsylvania Divorce Act provides that the proper courts
shall have power to grant divorces "notwithstanding the fact that the marriage
of the parties and the cause for divorce accrued outside of this Commonwealth,
1
4
Penna. Bar Asso. Quarterly, June, 1929, page 17; 77 Univ. of Pa. Law Rev. 1036, (1929).
161913 App. Cas. 30.
1627 Harvard Law Rev. 1, 13. (1913).
27C. Clothier Jones v. Adams, 98 Pa. Super. 246 (1930).
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and that both parties were at the time of the occurrence of said cause domiciled
without this Commonwealth * * * "1
STATE RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT
The Pennsylvania Divorce Act further provides that "No spouse shall be en-
titled to commence proceedings for divorce by virtue of this act who shall not
have been a bona fide resident in this Commonwealth at least one whole year im-
mediately previous to the filing of his oz her petition or libel. The libellant shall
be a competent witness to prove his or her residence.'2
In Heath v. Heath3 where the libellant proved residence within the Common-
wealth for eight years, but neglected to show if, or that, the eight year period
included the year immediately preceding the filing of the libel, the court decided
that it lacked jurisdiction.
The one year period dates back from the filing of the original libel, not from
the filing of an amended libel. In Barning v. Barning4 the date of an amendment
to the libel was not permitted to control where it would have made the date of the
amendment, instead of the date of filing the libel, the time prior to which the
year's residence was to be computed.
COUNTY RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT
The Act of June 10, 1935,5 provides that "All petitions or libels for divorce
shall be exhibited to the court of the county where either libellant or respondent
resides." The Pennsylvania courts have interpreted the word resides as meaning
"bona fide residence," 6 and again as indicating "domicile," 7 but in any case to
lAct of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, sec. 15, par. 1. A person who has acquired a bona fide
residence in this state and actually resided here for a year may bring his or her action in divorce
though the offending spouse never resided within the state and the cause of action arose out of
the state. Hilyard v. Hilyard, 87 Pa. Super. 1 (1926).
2Act of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, sec 16. This is taken from section 11 of the Act of Mar.
13, 1815, 6 Sm. L. 286, as construed by section 2 of the Act of May 8, 1854, P. L. 644, and section
2 of the Act of May 9, 1913, P. L. 191. See also section 1 of the Act of Mar. 9, 1855, P. L. 68.
344 Pa. Super. 118 (1910).
4
46 Pa. Super. 291 (1911).
5Act No. 128 of General Assembly of 1935, approved June 10, 1935. This is an amendment
to the Pennsylvania Divorce Act of 1929 which provided that:
"All petitions or libels for divorce shall be exhibited to the court of the county where the
libellant resides, except where the husband and wife shall be resident in different counties
of this Commonwealth, and, while so resident, a cause of divorce shall arise, in which case
the libellant, at his or her option may institute and prosecute proceedings either in the
county of his or her own residence or in the county wherein the respondent shall be resi-
dent and the cause for divorce shall have arisen." Act of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, sec.
15, par. 2.
6May v. May, 94 Pa. Super. 293 at 294 (1928).
7
May v. May, 94 Pa. Super. 294 (1928) ; Davis v. Davis, 91 Pa. Super. 354 (1927).
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mean more than the popular conception of the meanings of the words "resides"
or "residence." Physical presence alone, without a required mental state, does
not suffice.
The position of our courts is exemplified, in what might be called an ex-
treme case, in Davis v. Davis.8 Here the libellant, a resident of Philadelphia
County, left his wife's home, swore to a libel in divorce, and shortly afterwards
went to live, temporarily, in Bucks County, with friends. While the libellant
was at his friends' home, his libel was filed in Philadelphia County; to which
county, the libellant shortly afterwards returned. The court said: 9  "There was
nothing in the evidence which would warrant a finding that when the libellant
went to stay with his friends in Bucks County, he had the intention of making
that place his permanent home, with domiciliary intent. Having been domi-
ciled in Philadelphia that domicile must be presumed to be continued until another
sole domicile has been acquired by actual residence, coupled with the intention
of abandoning the domicile of origin."' 0 To the same effect the court in May v.
May" states: "Domicile is a jurisdictional requirement and is to be determined
by the intention of the party conjoined with an actual residence,
Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio12 is authority for the proposition that removal from
the county, after filing the libel, does not affect the jurisdiction.
There is no time requirement for residence in the county either by statute
or court decisions.
BONA FIDE RESIDENCE
According to the Pennsylvania Divorce Law, 13 in order to bring a lib in
divorce, the libellant must have been a bona fide resident of the state for one year.
What is meant by "a bona fide resident"? We must look to the courts for our
definition.
It has been held that physical presence or residence for one year within the
Commonwealth is not sufficient in itself to establish bona fide residence. This
residence must be accompanied by a domicilary intent which is not presumed but
must be shown by affirmative evidence. 14
On the other hand, in Price v. Price,"6 it was held that when the intention
of permanently residing in a place exists, a residence in pursuance of that intention,
however short, will establish a domicile. Hence, residence for a year or more,
891 Pa. Super, 354 (1927).
991 Pa. Super. 354 at 362 (1927).
lOltalics added.
1194 Pa. Super. 293 at 298 (1928).
1221 Dist. 564 (Pa., 1912).
1sSee footnote 2.
14 Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Super. 229 (1905); Dulin v. Dulin, 33 Super. 4 (1906),
15156 Pa. 617 (1893).
DICKINSON LAIW REVIEW
without a domiciliary intent is not sufficient; but neither is residence with domi-
ciliary intent, if for less than one year.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has defined domicile as "the place in
which, both in fact and intent, the home of a person is established without any
purpose to return to a former home; the place where he lives, in distinction from
that-where he transacts his business; the place where he chooses to abide, in dis-
tinction from that in which he may be for a temporary purpose; * * * -16
An example of very loose language is found in two opinions by Judge Or-
lady, of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, written within the space of two years.
In Reed v. Reed 17 the learned judge, in determining that the court had jurisdiction
as required by the statute, concludes: "Her mode of living, whether at rent, at
lodgings, or at the residence of employers or friends, was not material if her domi-
ciliary intention CONJOINED WITH residence is made out.''18 Since the sta-
tute requires "bona fide residence," the conclusion is inescapable that Judge Or-
lady is defining that term. However, the very next year we find him saying in
Dulhn v. Dulin:'9 "Our statutes and decisions require that it must affirmatively
appear that there has been a clear intention to abandon a former residence and to
make this State a permanent one with domiciliary intent, COUPLED WITH an
actual bona fide residence for one year * * * 20
The language of the two cases cited immediately above might have left the
interpretation of the term "bona fide residence" in some doubt, but it is submitted
that the language in Starr v. Starr,2' in conformity with Reed v. Reed,22 gives the
true interpretation. The Starr case held: "Domicile is a matter of intention; resi-
dence is a physical fact, and the term bona fide residence means residence with
domiciliary intent * * "23
The original domicile, however, is not lost by absence from the state, unless
there is an intent to abandon it.24
SEPARATE RESIDENCE OF HUSBAND AND WIFE
"The maxim that the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife was
founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between husband
iGGearing v. Gearing, 90 Pa. Super. 192 (1926) ; Gearing, Jr. v. Gearing, 83 Pa. Super. 423
(1924).
1730 Pa. Super, 229 (1905).
8ltalics and capitals added.
1933 Pa. Super. 4 (1906).
2O1talics and capitals added.
2178 Pa. Super. 579 (1921).
ZZ30 Pa. Super. 229 (1905).
2 3ltalics added.
Z4 Heath v. Heath, 44 Pa. Super. 118 (1910) ; Harrison v. Harrison, 69 Pa. Super. 580
(1917); Dulin v. Dulin, 33 Pa. Super. 4 (1906); Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Super. 261
(1913); Shaw v. Shaw, 72 Pa. Super. 191 (1918).
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and wife as established by law. It presupposes, from the very nature of the rela-
tionship, that the home of the one is the home of the other; * * * . Under
normal circumstances, therefore, the husband's domicile determines that of the
wife, because her home in fact follows his."25
In the above-quoted paragraph, what does the court mean by "normal cir-
cumstances"? A careful perusal of the cases indicates that the husband's domi-
cile determines that of the wife during cohabitation, and as long as the parties are
intending to continue the marital relation though they may be separated from one
another at times.2 6 Barning v. Barning27 held that even though a woman makes
an express pre-nuptial agreement with her prospective husband that she will main-
tain her domicile in this state, if, after the marriage, she should go to the state of
his domicile, his domicile determines hers, notwithstanding the agreement.
When the husband and wife become separated in two different residences,
however, through the fault of either one, the husband's domicile no longer de-
termines that of the wife. 28 It follows that the husband's domicile does not deter-
mine that of the wife for purposes of divorce when the parties are separated,29 and
that the wife must establish her own residence and domicile to give jurisdiction to
the court. It is submitted then, that "normal circumstances" mean all cases except
those in which the spouses are separated, and are either simply in a disharmonious
state or are contemplating or seeking divorce.
A distinction, however, must be made here. Although the spouses are sepa-
rated, the wife does not acquire a separate domicile unless she intends to abandon
her husband's home and set up an independent home of her own. 0
Ivo V. Giannini
2 5
Starr v. Starr, 78 Pa. Super. 579 at 581 (1921). Italics added.
26Barning v. Barning, 46 Pa. Super. 291 (1911); Colin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 (1867); Reed
v. Reed, 30 Pa. Super. 229 (1905); Hilyard v. Hilyard, 87 Pa. Super. 1 (1926); Betz v. Betz,
103 Pa. Super. 306 (1931).
2746 Pa. Super. 291 (1911).
28Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 (1867).
29Hilyard v. Hilyard, 87 Pa. Super. 1 (1926); Betz v. Betz, 103 Pa. Super. 306 (1931).
SOStarr v. Starr, 78 Pa. Super. 579 at 582 (1921).
